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Articles
W. H. Charles* Extrinsic Evidence and
Statutory Interpretation:
Judicial Discretion in Context
I. Introduction
... the Supreme Court of Canada recently signalled an
increasing receptiveness to the use of extrinsic materials in the
Anti-Inflation Reference. Accordingly, I expect that we will see
an increasing use by appellate courts of extrinsic evidence. '
This prediction was made by the Honourable Brian Dickson, a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, in an address in 1979. His
statement concerns a problem that has haunted Canadian, English,
and commonwealth courts for years, namely, how far beyond the
actual words of the statute itself is it permissible for courts to roam
in their efforts to interpret legislation? Put another way, what is the
proper context in which to interpret legislative directives? It is a
question that is unavoidably intertwined with the more general
problem of the proper approach to statutory interpretation, which in
turn raises questions about the proper constitutional function of a
court and the exercise of judicial discretion. For example, if Justice
Dickson is correct that the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated a
new approach to the use of extrinsic materials in the interpretation
of statutes, what is the reason for such a change and what is its
significance in relation to some of the other questions mentioned
above? Does a willingness to broaden the statutory context by
consulting extrinsic materials mean that the Supreme Court is
advocating a change in the courts' function vis-a-vis the legislature
and the executive?
In the following discussion, an attempt will be made to clarify
and delineate some of the underlying concerns that have supported
the historically limited use of extrinsic evidence and have resulted in
a limited context for interpretive purposes. This paper will also look
at what some Canadian courts actually do in spite of the
*Dean of the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. Dickson, The Role and Function of Judges (1979), The Law Soc. Gaz. 138 at
163.
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exclusionary rules. Finally, the significance of a more liberal use of
extrinsic materials will be considered.
II. The Traditional Approach of Commonwealth Courts to Extrinsic
Evidence
The traditionally accepted approach of common law courts to
extrinsic evidence has been to restrict reference to materials that are
considered external to the words of the legislative enactment being
interpreted. This so-called extrinsic material can include such items
as prior versions of the same statute, statutes in pari materia, Royal
Commission and Law Commission reports, reports of select
committees of the legislature, and Hansard debates. Although it is
now generally acknowledged that statutes in pari materia and
previous versions of the same statute are admissible in appropriate
circumstances, 2 Canadian, English, and commonwealth courts
continue to prohibit reference to materials involving the legislative
history of statutory provisions. Thus, consideration of legislative
debates as recorded in Hansard is absolutely prohibited. 3
However, the pressure to have courts change their long-
established exclusionary rule with regard to extrinsic evidence has
been increasing for some time. One important factor that has
emerged in the last fifteen years has been the creation of Law
Reform Commissions in many jurisdictions and the resulting
publication of numerous Law Reform Commission reports. Courts
have found it increasingly difficult to ignore the guidance and
assistance provided by Law Reform Commission studies and reports
when called upon to interpret the provisions of a statute enacted
pursuant to such a report. The difficulty increases considerably
when the Law Reform Commission report includes a draft statute
which, upon comparison, is found to follow very closely the words
2. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at
131-132. For recent examples of the application of this rule by the Supreme Court
of Canada, see Nova Omoca Canada Petroleum Co. Ltd. et al (1981) 38 N.R. 381
per Estey J. for the court at 392; Saskatchewan Power Corp. v. Trans Canada
Pipelines and Natural Energy Bd. (1982) 39 N.R. 595; Langille and Langille v.
Toronto Dominion Bank (1982) 40 N.R. 67; and R. v. Hutt (1978) 19 N.R. 33 1.
3. The exclusionary rule was first developed and applied in 1769 by an English
court in the case of Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr 302, 98 E. R. 201 at 217. It has since
been adopted in Canadian and commonwealth courts but has been rejected by
American judges. See, for example, A. G. Can. v. Readers Digest Assn., [1961]
S.C.R. 775, 30 D.L.R. (3d) 296, and South Australia v. The Commonwealth,
[1942] 65 C.L.R. at 410.
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of the statute enacted in response to that report. The result in Canada
has been a growing number of cases, in recent years, in which the
courts have permitted reference to Law Commission and Royal
Commission reports for limited purposes.
4
II. The Underlying Problem -Proper Context
As societies grow more complex, the need for legal regulation
appears to increase in proportion. The primary source of new laws
in a modern state is the legislature. Theoretically reflecting a social
consensus, Parliament enacts laws that are deemed to be in the
public interest and for the public good. These laws and regulations
may confer benefits or privileges upon certain individuals or groups
within society, or, conversely, may impose duties and respon-
sibilities as well. In an era of statutes, clear statements of the law by
the promulgating institution are obviously of prime importance.
Unfortunately, modern social problems are often complex and
require complicated legislative solutions. Drafting techniques
currently in use by most common law jurisdictions further
exacerbate the problem by creating statutes that abound in detail, so
much so that the basic thrust of the legislative enactment is often
difficult to determine.
In cases where a dispute arises concerning the meaning of a
statutory provision, it falls to the courts to render authoritative
pronouncements as to the meaning of the words in question. An
analysis of the workloads of Courts of Appeal in particular would
indicate that they spend a significant amount of their time hearing
cases that involve questions about the proper meaning of statutory
provisions. It would be comforting to think that because so much of
their time is devoted to interpreting statutory language, our common
law courts have developed a well-defined and well-understood
uniform process of interpretation. The existence of such a uniform
approach to interpretation would be extremely helpful to citizens
and their advisers in their attempts to understand legislative
directives. Unfortunately, the principles of statutory interpretation
do not form "the most stable, consistent, or logically satisfying part
4. Home Oil Distributors Ltd. v.A.G.B.C., [1940] S.C.R. 444, [1940] 2 D.L.R.
609; A.G. Can. v. Readers Digest Assn., Id.; Gaysek v. The Queen, [1971]
S.C.R. 888; Can. Indemnity Co. et al v. A.G.B.C., [1975] 3 W.W.R. 224,
B.C.S.C. (Aikens J.); Reference Re Anti Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373;
Laidlaw v. The Municipality of Metro Toronto (1978) 30 M.R. 515; and Re
Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981 ] I S.C.R. 714.
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of our jurisprudence. . . "5 The difficulty stems from the fact that
rules of statutory interpretation, although reasonably clear when
they stand alone, are often difficult to apply. The problem is
compounded by the fact that there are other rules of interpretation
that appear to be in conflict, and yet we lack any accepted hierarchy
of rule importance or application.
The jurisprudential deficiency suggested here has been recog-
nized by the United Kingdom Law Commission in their report
covering the interpretation of statutes. 6 One particularly difficult
problem addressed by the commission, and one that may very well
be fundamental to the whole problem of statutory interpretation,
concerns the proper use of extrinsic material by judges in the
interpretive process. What material, apart from the statute itself, can
be legitimately consulted by a court of law in its attempt to give an
authoritative meaning to the words of Parliament? This is basically a
problem of context. As one member of the American judiciary
framed the question, "What is below the surface of the words and
yet fairly a part of them?"
7
The availability of an ever-increasing number of reports from
Law Reform Commissions has done much to emphasize the need
for a clear policy with regard to this important aspect of the
interpretive process. Canadian courts have fairly consistently
followed the practice of English courts and have adopted English
precedents when making rulings concerning the use of extrinsic
materials. Unfortunately, neither our Canadian courts nor those of
England have adopted a consistent and uniform approach to the use
of extrinsic materials in the sense of determining what aids to
interpretation, external to the statute under consideration, are
legitimate and permissible, and the purposes for which this material
might be used. 8 Nor have the legislatures of Canada, except for that
of Nova Scotia, 9 provided guidance through the various interpreta-
5. Allen, Law in The Making, 7th ed. (1964) at 526.
6. The Interpretation of Statutes, (1969) Law Commission No. 21 and Scot. Law
Comm. No. 1I.
7. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,"
(1947) 2 The Record of the Assoc. of the Bar of the City ofN.Y. 213 at 220.
8. Lord Scarman, a member of the House of Lords, has noted that "... judicial
practice (in the U.K.) in regard to referring to material outside the words of the
statute in order to discover its meaning is very divergent . . . and we have not as a
body of judges as yet established what are legitimate aids to interpretation outside
the statute and for what purposes they may be used." House of Lords Debates on
Interpretation of Legislation Bill, 13 February 1980 at p. 280.
9. Interpretation Act, R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 151, s. 8(5).
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tion acts as to what material might be utilized by the courts and how
it might be used.
The need for legislative guidance has been recognized in the
United Kingdom with regard to both a recommended general
approach to interpretation and the use of extrinsic material by a
court. Lord Scarman, in an attempt to give effect to earlier
recommendations of the Law Reform Commissions of the United
Kingdom and Scotland and the Renton Committee on the
Preparation of Legislation, introduced an Interpretation Bill into the
House of Lords in 1980 and 1981.10 The bill would have permitted
a court to refer to extrinsic materials in the form of international
agreements relevant to the statute, as well as to Royal Commission
or Law Commission reports. The proposed bill did not make it clear
whether the statutory language first had to be found to be ambiguous
before the extrinsic material could be consulted.
Although the bill itself survived the House of Lords debates,
those parts of it dealing with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
were deleted, a position supported by the Law Society and by the
Law Reform Committee of the Senate. Members of the British Bar
expressed concern that if the admission of extrinsic materials were
permitted, litigation costs would increase and trials would be
lengthened by the introduction of great masses of only marginally
relevant material. The bill, as a whole, did not survive second
reading in the Commons. Thus, the first tentative steps towards
providing English courts with legislative guidance about extrinsic
materials were thwarted. English courts were left to struggle in their
own morass of judicial doubt and uncertainty. But they are not
alone. As we shall see, the practice of Canadian courts reveals the
same uncertainty and ambivalence when faced with extrinsic
materials in the interpretive process."
IV. The Appropriate Context: A Matter of Judicial Discretion?
Questions about the kind of extrinsic materials that a court may
properly consult and the purposes for which they may be used are
really questions about context. What is the appropriate context
within which the court should interpret the statutory provisions?
How much discretion should a court have to determine that
10. House of Lords Debates, supra, note 8 at 275-306, and 9 March 1981,
p. 63-84.
11. See Part I1 of this paper, where individual cases are discussed.
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context?' 2 These questions tend to focus attention upon the main
issue involved, which is that of judicial discretion and its proper
limitations in a democratic society. Are there limits upon this
judicial discretion, and if so, how are they set? If the legislature is
not prepared to outline what should be the proper context for
interpretation purposes, what factors should a court take into
account when exercising its judicial discretion?
(a) The Proper Context from Different Points of View
(i) The Reader -Language and Communication Theory
Before looking at the factors a court might consider important in the
course of exercising its discretion concerning extrinsic materials, let
us examine the question of "proper context" from other points of
view. From the standpoint of language and communication theory,
the more extensive the context that the receiver of the information of
a communication has, the more likely it is that the message or
thought or meaning that is intended to be conveyed will be
accurately received. If a reader of a statute were able to read the
finished product after having taken part in the entire manufacturing
process, from tentative policy proposal to final draft statute, he or
she might have a reasonably good understanding of the statute as a
whole. Its general purpose or purposes would be known and
appreciated, as well as the scheme or structure of the statute and the
rationale for individual sections. But in actual practice, there are
very few individuals who are involved in every phase of a statutory
enactment. If the item being interpreted is a recently enacted piece
of legislation, the citizen may have read about the statute and
followed its progress through the legislative machinery as reported
in the media. Some may even read the statute itself. The really
interested citizen can expand that context by tracing the history of a
particular bill through the legislative journals or Hansard. But, for
all practical purposes, the average reader of the legislative directive
will be reading specific legislative provisions in a context that is
limited to the confines of the statute itself. 1
3
12. This question confronted the House of Lords in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines
Ltd., [1981] A.C. 251. Their Lordships were urged to examine "travaux
preparatoires" as an aid to the interpretation of an International Convention. Lord
Scarman admitted that the court had a discretion and observed that "the exercise of
this discretion is the true difficulty raised by the present case", at 294.
13. Although Lord Denning seems to assume that both ordinary citizens and
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It should be kept in mind, however, that the reader of the statute,
in many cases, will not be the citizen, but will be an intermediary
specialist or expert, such as lawyer or an accountant, who, having
read the statute, will then advise his client. It is possible, of course,
that the statute will be read by either the specialist or the citizen just
for interest's sake, but more often it will be read with certain factual
situations in mind which involve certain kinds of activities. For
example, if examined at the planning phase, the words of the
statutes will be read with the client's interest in mind and the
provisions will be interpreted as favourably as possible, so as to
allow the client to do what is desired. If the statute is read after the
fact and after the client has already acted, the pressure or inclination
to put on the words a meaning that would be favourable to the client
will be increased considerably. But in some situations, the language
of the statute may be so clear and precise that only one meaning is
possible. Expanding the context may not point to an alternative
meaning.
(ii) The Draftsman
The draftsman should approach the statute with a perspective that
involves a broader context than that available to the ordinary citizen
and with a more detailed understanding of the statutory provisions. It is
the draftsman who has been informed by the proponents of the statute
as to the reasons for the proposed legislation or its social purpose, and it
is he who has endeavoured to draw up a legislative scheme that will, it
is hoped, effectively carry out the assigned purpose or purposes. He
has also carefully chosen appropriate language to communicate
specific thoughts, ideas, information, directions, principles, or
concepts. Working as he is from the inside, the draftsman, as creator of
the statute, should have a detailed and comprehensive understanding
of his legislative product. The product may undergo changes in the
legislative mill as the result of political compromises, and the effect of
this process on the statute may be to require the elimination or addition
of some provisions or the modification of others. Political
accommodation may even require that specific provisions, initially
included in the statute, be changed so that they are purposely vague and
lawyers, being -men of affairs", will "have their own feeling for the meaning of
the words and know the reason why the Act was passed - just as if it had been
fully set out in a preamble." The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworths, 1979)
at 10.
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general. Even so, the draftsman, if anyone, should have the most
complete background understanding of the new legislation. Even
individual members of Parliament and the minister responsible for this
new law will not be as fully conversant with all its provisions as will the
draftsman. When the draftsman selects words with a particular
meaning in mind, he will be doing so with the benefit of a context that is
quite different from that available to the ordinary legislator, citizen,
lawyer, or judge.
(iii) The Court
If we accept the fact that readers of the statute will come to it with
different degrees of understanding and information about it and its
background, how do we answer the question of what the proper context
is in which a court should seek to interpret a statute? Should the court
confine itself to the narrowest possible context, interpreting the words
before it in the context of their immediate section or subsection? If the
words are clear and convey a meaning that seems to be reasonable to the
reader, should the court accept that meaning without looking further?
Most courts, including Canadian courts, respond negatively to this
question and emphasize that particular words or provisions in a statute
should be read in the context of the whole act, and not in isolation. 
14 If
the court reads the specific words in question in the context of the entire
statute, it may also try to discover the general legislative purpose of the
statute as a whole or the more particular purpose of the individual
section or subsection. With this information at hand, the court may
then try to place a meaning upon the specific words in dispute.
However, there is also contemporary and judicial authority of
considerable vintage that permits a court to expand the context beyond
the statute itself and to look at material external to the statute in
order to interpret the legislative language. 15
14. See, for example, the comments of Mr. Justice Ritchie, speaking for the
Supreme Court of Canada in a recent case, Yellow Cab Ltd. v. Ind. Rel. Bd. (1980)
33 M.R. 585 at 592, who cautioned, "It must be remembered that the act can only
be properly construed when it is real as a whole..."; see also the admonition of
Viscount Simonds of the House of Lords in A. G. v. Prince Ernest Augustus of
Hanover, [1 957] A.C. 436 at 463, who exclaimed that it was an elementary rule
"that no one should profess to understand any part of a statute or any other
document before he has read the whole of it. Until he has done so, he is not entitled
to say that it or any part of it is clear or ambiguous."
15. In the case of Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De & G.M.A.G. 1, 20, Turner
L.J. advised that "In construing acts of Parliament, the words which are used are
not alone to be regarded. Regard must also be had to the context and meaning of the
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When approaching these questions about the proper context for their
interpretive endeavours, some judges have emphasized the fact that
their constitutional function restricts them to discovering and applying
the law as enacted by the supreme lawmaker, Parliament. 16 These
judges view their primary role to be that of uncovering Parliament's
intention as that intention is revealed by the words of the statute. If the
language is ambiguous, the court can clarify it by seeking guidance
from the general legislative purpose of the statute, as found in the
statute itself. 17 Courts adopting this approach do so because they feel
that it is democratic and fair to the citizen, it recognizes the supremacy
of parliamentary doctrine, and it contributes to certainty in the law.
Other courts, searching for the same legislative intent, have concluded
that an external context must be consulted if the true legislative
intention and statutory purpose are to be revealed. Although the courts
taking this approach may not openly discuss the conflicting
considerations, they will emphasize the importance of discovering the
actual legislative intention and will ignore or tend to treat as
subordinate the certainty of law argument and the impact on the citizen
of consulting extrinsic material. Other factors which are seldom
articulated by courts, regardless of the approach they take, involve
legislator . . . we have therefore to consider not merely the words of this act of
Parliament, but the intent of the legislature, to be collected from the cause and
necessity of the act being made, from a comparison of its several parts and from
foreign (meaning extrinsic) circumstances, so far as they can justly be considered to
throw light upon the subject." This statement has often been cited as authoritative
and is said to be a modem statement of the rule laid down in Stradling and Morgan
(1560) 1 Plowden 199, and Heydon's case. See also A.G. v. Prince Ernest
Augustus of Hanover, supra, note 14, in which Viscount Simonds explained that to
interpret legislative words in their context meant ". . 'context' in its widest
sense, which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting
provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other
statutes in pari materia and the mischief which I can by those and other legitimate
means discern the statute was intended to remedy" (at p. 461). Professor Dreidger
has suggested that the modern principle of construction involves reading the words
of an act "in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense,
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the Intention of
Parliament." Op cit., note 2 at p. 67. By "entire context", Driedger seems to
include a context beyond the four corners of the act; see p. 123.
16. Duff, J., Corporation of Point Greg v. Shannon (1922) 63 S.C.R. 556; Anglin
J., Arnold v. Dominion Textile Co., (1918) 56 S.C.R. 433; Davies J., Gosselin v.
The King (1903) 33 S.C.R. 255; and Ritchie J., London Life Insurance Co. v.
Wright (1880) 5 S.C.R. 466 at 474.
17. InMcBratney v. McBratney (1920) 50 D.L.R. 132 at 140, DuffJ. went further
and declared that if the language was capable of two or more meanings, the court was
obliged to seek the objection or principle of the statute if the object or principle could be
collected from its language.
16 The Dalhousie Law Journal
concerns about increasing government regulation, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the need to make legislative solutions as effective
and workable as possible if complex societal problems are to be cured.
As already suggested, 18 communications theory requires that
legislative provisions in dispute be interpreted within a very broad
context, so as to obtain the greatest accuracy in terms of what the
communicator- in this case, the legislature- meant. Guided by this
consideration, the court should strive to place itself in the shoes of the
draftsman, if at all possible. This approach, however, might be
considered to be unfair to the ordinary citizen who is unable to do the
same thing and, for practical reasons, is limited to a much narrower
context when reading the statute. It might also be relevant to consider
what the expectations of the legislators were when they approved the
draftsman's handywork. Would they have expected the statute to be
read without the aid of extrinsic materials and, therefore, in a narrow
historical context, or would they, as Lord Denning has suggested, 19
expect that citizens would have a somewhat broader context against
which to interpret the statutory words? Before considering how these
questions might be answered, we should examine the extent to which
judicial discretion exists in the interpretive process.
(b) Judicial Discretion in the Interpretive Process Generally
When a case involving the interpretation of a statute comes before a
court, different problems of interpretation may be involved. In the
most common situation, opposing counsel are urging the court to
accept different clear meanings. One counsel, for example, may
argue that the words of the statute be given their ordinary and
primary meaning, while opposing counsel may argue for a
secondary meaning which is of a technical nature. In many
situations, the question appears to be one of the application of the
statute, in the sense of words being given a narrow, rather than a
broad, meaning, or vice versa. In all these cases, it is argued, the
language is grammatically capable of two or more meanings, and
the court is being asked to determine which meaning is correct in
terms of the legislative intent.
There are, however, other situations where the problem of
interpretation presented to the court does not involve the court
making a choice between possible meanings, but involves an
18. Supra, at p. 7.
19. Supra, note 13 at 10.
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argument that the court should amend the words of the statute by
reading words into the act or, conversely, by ignoring words that are
there or substituting one word for another. In these cases, the
amendments are requested in order to carry out what is alleged to be
a clear purpose of the act, which requires the court to fill in a gap in
the statute or to correct what is clearly a drafting error. The type of
interpretation problem presented to the court is important because it
may affect the extent to which the court is being asked to legislate.
20
The foregoing discussion also serves as a reminder that a court
approaches a problem of interpretation with legal arguments which
have been made by counsel, and that these arguments normally urge
the court to accept two different meanings. When reading the act for
the first time, the court will, of necessity, have to place some
meaning on individual words, and in so doing, the judges will
usually give the words their ordinary and usual, or primary,
meaning. The first decision a court will have to make is whether,
having given the words their usual and ordinary meaning in the
narrow context of the section or subsection, they should also declare
the words to be clear or plain and capable of only one meaning. If
the court decides to adopt this literal approach, it may be doing so
when it does not have a clear understanding of the purpose of the act
as a whole, or even of the purpose of the particular section or
subsection in dispute. Courts adopting this approach are generally
considered to be taking an unusually narrow view of context, and
one which is not warranted. 2 1 It is more usual for the court to read
the provisions in dispute in the context of the statute as a whole,
thus giving meaning to the language in a broader context. By so
doing, the court may be able to obtain some insight into the general
purpose of the legislative enactment and the scheme of the act, as
well.
When the court declares that the words of a section or subsection
are plain and clear, it has usually, at a minimum, read them in the
context of the act as a whole and, in the situation where several
meanings are possible, has chosen one meaning over another. The
basis for that choice may be that the meaning fits with the general
purpose of the act or the particular purpose of that section of the act,
20. In a recent decision, Chief Justice Laskin warned that a court could not add words
to a statute unless they were implicit. SeeB. C. Provincial Ct. v. B.C. Packers (1978)
19 N.R. 320 at 325. This approach at least indicates ajudicial willingness to legislate if
the legislative intention is clear enougl.
21. As previously noted, supra, at p. 10.
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as read in the context of other sections, or that the meaning selected
is compatible with the general principles of the common law and
does not produce a result that appears to the court to be unfair,
unjust, or anomalous. A result is sometimes considered to be
anomalous or startling when it is looked at in light of the general
purpose of the act, as perceived by the court, or in light of general,
basic principles of the common law, or in light of the judge's own
sense of justice in a given situation.
If, after looking at the words in question in the context of the act as a
whole, the court is undecided as to which meaning was intended by the
legislature, or if, in the case of correcting errors or filling gaps, the
interpreter is unable to sufficiently grasp the purpose of the act, the
court is faced with a further decision involving context: should the
context be broadened even further so that material external to the
statute itself is considered? This wider context may provide the court
with a clear appreciation of the purpose of the statute, or the so-called
mischief. We must remember that counsel may have argued for the
context to be widened and may have presented in their brief or oral
argument some of this external material. If this is the case, then the
context has, in fact, already been broadened and the court is really
making the decision of whether or not it will pay any attention to the
material placed before it by counsel. It is the decision to look outside
the statute that actually involves other issues that must be seriously
considered by the court. Before examining these, however, it might be
useful to remind ourselves of some practical general assumptions that
underlie judicial interpretation of statutes. These might include the
following:
1. The legislature enacting the statute had some general purpose or
purposes in mind. Certain social consequences were planned for
and anticipated. These, although perhaps short term in light of
historical common law legal principles, were nevertheless deemed
to be in the best interest of the public at the time they were enacted.
2. The draftsman was aware of the general purpose or purposes of
the statute, and he prepared a statutory framework or scheme and
selected the most appropriate language to accurately communicate
the legislators' directive and to accomplish the designated purpose
or purposes of the enactment.
3. The English language, given the proper context, is sufficiently
precise and unambiguous to allow the legislative directives to be
communicated accurately in the majority of cases.
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4. The communicator and the receiver had in common a set of
understandings involving language and its use, social values, etc. In
other words, both parties share a common, general social context.
5. In most cases, the purpose or purposes of the statutes can be
discovered by reading the statute itself.
V. The External Context: To Look or Not to Look -
Judicial Considerations
Returning to the question of whether a court should look outside the
statute for assistance and the issues that are raised by this question, I
have already indicated that communications theory dictates that a
broad context will best insure that specific provisions are interpreted
accurately in terms of the intended meaning. This would suggest that if
the court sees its primary function as that of determining and applying
the will of the legislature, 22 then it should make every effort to place
itself in the shoes of the draftsman. 23 The supremacy of parliamentary
22. The attempt to discover the actual intention of Parliament, insofar as such a
collective body can be said to have a collective intention, is seen by continental jurists
as a subjective approach to interpretation. This view can be found in the writings of
several Scandinavian authors. See, for example, Thornsdale, The Principles of
Legality and Teleological Construction of Statutes in Criminal Law, 4 Scandinavian
Studies in Law 211 at 238 (1960), and Stramholm, Legislative Material and
Construction ofStatutes; noteson the ContinentalApproach, 10 Scandinavian Studies
in Law 175 (1966). See also Lenhoff, Interpretive Theories: A Comparative Study
in Legislation, 27 Text. Rev. 312 (1927).
23. This approach has been advocated recently by several members of the House of
Lords. See the remarks of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Maunsell v. Olins, [ 1975] A. C.
373 at 395, and in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papieriverk Walhof
Aschaffenburg A.G., [1975] A.C. 591 at 646. Lord Reid went further in the latter
case and suggested that:
The general rule in construing any document is that one should put oneself in the
shoes of the maker or makers and thus take into account relevant facts known to
them when the document was made. The same must apply to acts of Parliament
subject to one qualification. An act is addressed to all the lieges and it would seem
wrong to take into account any thing that was not public knowledge at the time.
This is not, however, a new approach, having first been advocated over a century ago
by Lord Westburg in re Mew and Thorne (1862) 31 L.J. K. B. 87, where he supported a
decision to look at the report of a commission and the speech of the member who
introduced it, by saying: "How I advert to these matters for the purpose of abiding by
the rule of interpretation which was approved of by Lord Coke, that in the
interpretation of a statute it is desirable first to consider the state of the law existing at
the time of its introduction and then the complaints or evils that were existing or were
supposed to exist in that state of the law, and I do this for the purpose only of putting the
interpreter of the law in the same position in which the legislature itself was placed; and
this is done properly for the purpose of gaining assistance in interpreting the words of
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doctrine would also support this approach. In the same way, a judge
who considers his proper function as a member of the judiciary to be
that of promoting the reasoned development of the law may also favour
it. However, if the court sees itself as a mediator between the citizen
and the state, it may very well invoke the principle of the rule of law to
support a position that emphasizes the need for clear and certain law.
24
According to the rule of law approach, the citizen should only be
responsible for obeying the law that is communicated to him or her in
clear terms. The courts' responsibility is to give effect to what the
legislators have said, not to what they meant to say. Such an approach
would argue for a narrow context, or at least for one that is no wider
than that available to the ordinary citizen. The rule of law approach has
particular significance in cases in which the legislation imposes duties
or responsibilities upon citizens or adversely affects rights to property
or personal liberty.
In support of the "court as mediator" approach is the concern many
judges have about their image as adjudicators, rather than law-makers.
A common perception of a court is that it is an impartial and unbiased
tribunal - one that gives no preference to one party or the other, but
decides the issues before it objectively. In addition to being impartial
as between the parties, judges must also be careful not to give the
impression of usurping the legislative function through creative
lawmaking, that is, by giving expression to their own personal
policies. Obviously, there is an important difference between a judge
making his own law, based on personal values oran assessment of what
society needs, and attempting to give effect to the legislative intent by
broadening or narrowing the provisions of a statute or even filling in
gaps or correcting errors. 2 5 Both kinds of activities might be
the law, not that one will be warranted in giving those words any different meaning
from that which is consistent with theirplain and ordinary signification, but at the same
time it may somewhat assist in interpreting the words and in ascertaining the object to
which they were directed" (p. 89).
24. Several members of the House of Lords have emphasized this point. Lord
Simon has declared that it was incontestible that "[t]he Court is a mediating
influence between the executive and the legislature on the one hand and the citizen
on the other." Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., [1978] 1 All E.R. 948 at 953.
To the same effect, see the remarks of Lord Diplock in Fothergill v. Monarch
Airlines, supra, note 12 at 279.
25. Lon Fuller has suggested that "it is not the function of courts to create new
aims for society or to impose on society new basic directives", because they are
unsuited for this kind of task. But it is a legitimate function of the courts, according
to Professor Fuller, to decide and even discover on a case-by-case basis what the
generally shared aims and authoritative directives of a society (presumably known
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considered objectionable on the basis of affording unfair surprise to the
citizen, but at least a legitimate attempt to discover the real intention of
the legislature is not open to the accusation of unjustified law-making,
unless it is used as a screen for a court that wants to impose its own sense
of social policy upon the public. There seems to be a general suspicion
or fear that courts that adopt a purpose-finding approach to
interpretation are prone to overstep the bounds of legitimate
law-making and that individual judges may be tempted to refine the
meaning of statutes to accord with their own view of acceptable social
purposes or objectives. Statutory interpretation can never be wholly
objective, and courts cannot avoid some degree of law-making in their
role as participants in the process of refining and applying statutory
policies. Whether engaged in the interpretation and application of
statutes or the common law, the courts must somehow discover what
truly are the enduring, shared moral standards and purposes of society,
and give effect to them.
26
The judiciary is, in fact, one of the principal organs of a
democratic society, without which government can be carried on
only with the greatest difficulty. Should the court see itself as a
co-partner with the legislature and its judicial task as that of
applying statutes in an intelligent, reasoned, and sometimes even
creative manner?27 Or does this stance detract too much from the
principle of judicial independence or offend the doctrine of the
separation of powers? Having been trained as lawyers, most judges
are psychologically committed to the maintenance of law and order.
In this sense, the court will tend to support the executive branch of
government in cases where a party before the court is arguing an
opposed position.
With the increasing governmental regulation in contemporary
societies, courts would seem to face a growing dilemma: how can
they act as a cooperative partner with the legislature in the
implementation of legislative purposes and strive to preserve social
stability through the maintenance of law and order, while, at the
same time, playing the role of mediator and protector of citizens in
their disputes with the state? Such considerations are seldom
or apparent to a court) demand for their realization in particular cases. The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, [ 1978] 92 Harv. L.Rev. 353 at 292.
26. Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, Vol. XLVI Can. B. Rev.
406 at p. 435 (1968).
27. Kernochon, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method (1976) L.J. Vol.
3, No. 2,333 at 346.
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discussed openly by members of the judiciary when they decide
cases involving the interpretation of legislation. I suspect that, in
some instances, judges are not aware that these conflicting
principles are at work in the background of their reasoning. But,
consciously or not, they are present and they underlie many judicial
decisions. The relative weight given to each factor may, in the end,
determine the extent to which extrinsic material is admitted in
evidence and the purpose for which it is ultimately used by the
court.
VI. The Present Position in Canada
Insofar as extrinsic materials are concerned, Canadian courts have
drawn a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional
cases. Because the courts are trying to characterize statutes and
determine their purposes when their constitutional validity is
challenged, or, in other words, because the courts are attempting to
determine the statutes' pith and substance, they have adopted a
more liberal attitude towards the use of extrinsic materials in such
situations. But even in nonconstitutional cases, it is now
well-established procedure for Canadian courts to look at the history
of an enactment, in the sense of prior versions of the same statute,
and at statutes in pari materia when the court has decided that the
language is ambiguous. 28 Canadian courts have also permitted
counsel, particularly in constitutional cases, to introduce extrinsic
evidence in the form of Royal Commission reports in order to
outline the social conditions that existed at the time the legislation
was passed. From this wider contextual base, the court is able to
draw inferences about the purpose or pith and substance of the
statute.
29
But even in cases involving a question of constitutionality, our
Canadian courts have, until very recently, been rather ambivalent
and uneasy about the use of evidence in Royal Commission reports.
When counsel try to use such extrinsic evidence for purposes other
than giving a general picture of the social conditions at the time, as
28. See note 2, supra, for reference to such cases. See also Estey J. in Re Regional
Municipality of Ottaiva-Carleton and Township of Goulbourn (1979) 29 M.R. 267
at 284.
29. A.B.B.C. v.A.G. Can. (1889) 14 A.C. 295 at 303, 14 S.C.R. 345 at 361-369;
Re Provincial Fisheries, (1895] 26 S.C.R. 444 at 456-465; Re Representation in
House of Commons (1903) 33 S.C.R. 475 at 497 and 581-593; and C.P.R.V. James
BayR.R. (1905) 36 S.C.R. 72 at 90, 93, and 99.
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by citing the recommendations made by the commission as evidence
of the purpose of the statute or the meaning to be attributed to
specific provisions, they have met with general resistance on the
part of the judiciary. It must be admitted, however, that there are a
growing number of instances where individual judges have resorted
to extrinsic material for direct evidence of legislative intention. The
result is to make it very difficult to pronounce a clear rule or
position that has been officially and uniformly adopted in Canadian
courts. A clearer understanding of the present position can only be
obtained by an examination of some of the important decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada.
(a) Royal Commission Reports
In 1940, the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to review a
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the case of
Home Oil Distributors v. The Attorney General for B.C.3" The
provincial court had concluded that the report of a sole
commissioner, appointed pursuant to the Public Inquiries Act,
should be admitted in evidence only insofar as it found facts which
were relevant to the alleged purpose and effect of the enactment.
The matter in dispute was the validity of The Coal and Petroleum
Product Control Board Act (1937) of British Columbia. In the
Supreme Court of Canada, two members of the court did not find it
necessary to deal with the point, another appeared to be prepared to
admit this kind of extrinsic evidence in proper circumstances, and
one member did not advert to the problem at all and cannot be said
to have expressed a view one way or the other regarding the
admissibility of the report. Only Kerwin C. J., with Rinfret C. J.
concurring, specifically concluded that the report was admissible as
it was a recital of what was present to the mind of the legislature, the
evil to be abated, and the suggested remedy. 31 Mr. Justice Kerwin
pointed out that the House of Lords had admitted such a report in the
case of Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. The Controller
General of Patents. 
32
The issue came before the Supreme Court of Canada once again in
1961, through a rather back-handed way in the Reader's Digest case. 33
30. Supra, footnote 4.
31. The approach approved inHegdons Case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 ER 637.
32. [1898] A.C. 571 at 575.
33. Supra, note 3.
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In this case, the constitutional validity of part of the Excise Tax Act3 4
was attacked on the basis that the legislation was designed to benefit
one segment of the publishing industry at the expense of another.
Being thus legislation concerning property and civil rights, it was ultra
vires the Canadian Parliament. The plaintiff tried to introduce into
evidence statements made by the minister on first reading in the House.
This evidence was held inadmissible, but, because of the nature of
counsel's arguments, the court had to consider the question of the
admissibility of Royal Commission reports.
Kerwin C.J. referred to the position he had adopted in the Home Oil
case, and explained that he had taken into consideration a
commissioner's report, "but only for the purpose of showing what was
present to the mind of Parliament. ,35 Justices Taschereau Abbott and
Judson J. J. concurred. Justices Cartwright and Locke concluded that
there was no Canadian decision requiring Royal Commission reports
to be admitted, and, in their opinion, the general rule was that if the
report was objected to by opposing counsel, it should be excluded. Mr.
Justice Ritchie, with whom Mr. Justice Martland concurred, noted that
his remarks were dicta, and then went on to stress the fact that "when
such reports have been referred to by this court and the Privy Council in
cases involving the constitutional validity of a statute, they have been
referred to otherwise than as direct evidence of intention."
'36
Admittedly, the remarks of the Supreme Court Justices in the Readers
Digest case are technically dicta, but they do represent an important
and deliberate effort to deal with the problem. In light of the diverse
approaches taken, however, it is difficult to say that a clear rule had
emerged.
Ten years later, Mr. Justice Ritchie, speaking for the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Gaysek v. The Queen,3 7 appeared to
approve of the position taken by Mr. Justice Cartwright in theReader' s
Digest case with regard to the Royal Commission report. 38 Although
Mr. Justice Ritchie consulted a report, he nevertheless declared that he
could not derive any assistance from it. He also appeared to approve of
the opinion of the House of Lords in the Assam Railways case,
39
34. Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. (1952) c. 100.
35. Supra, note 3 at 782.
36. Supra, note 3 at 796.
37. Supra, note 4.
38. Supra, note 3.
39. ASSAM Ry and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commrs., [1934] A.C.
445.
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namely, that the report of a Royal Commission was of less value than
the inadmissible remarks of a minister of the Crown which are used to
introduce a piece of legislation. The basis for such a position was
apparently that the legislatures may not have followed the
recommendations of the commissioners and that these recommenda-
tions were, therefore, of little value. Thus, the opinion of Mr. Justice
Ritchie in the Gaysek case hardly represents a vote of confidence as to
the usefulness of Royal Commission reports and it appears to suggest
that these reports should not be admissible at all. Up to this point, there
seems to be very little in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
that would encourage counsel to argue for the admissibility of these
reports. If they are admissible, they appear to be only barely
so, and then only for a limited purpose and subject to objection by
opposing counsel.
This was not, however, the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice
Aikins of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 1975.40 After an
extensive review of Supreme Court decisions, he suggested that there
was "no decision in a constitutional case which laid down a plain rule
that a report of the Royal Commission may be admitted in evidence in
proper circumstances, or that such a report is not admissible in
evidence irrespectful of the circumstances." ' 4 1 Mr. Justice Aikins
went on to suggest that the weight of authority fell on the side of
admissibility, subject to the caveat that the report should not be taken as
prohibitive of the fact asserted therein or of the validity of the opinions
expressed. He noted that such reports could be used as the material
before the legislature which might have revealed the mischief or evil
with which the legislature was concerned. The effect of a court
consulting such extrinsic material would be to give the legislation a
broader context that would otherwise be revealed.
It may be significant that Mr. Justice Aikins did not refer to the
decision of Mr. Justice Ritchie in the Gaysek case. 42 Had he done
so, he might have thought the Supreme Court was suggesting that
Royal Commission reports were of no use and should not be
admitted into evidence. Having concluded that the weight of
authority, apart from the Gaysek43 case, favoured the admissibility
of Royal Commission reports, Mr. Justice Aikins went on to declare
that, on principle, the same rules should apply to the reports of
40. Supra, note 4.
41. Supra, note 4 at 234.
42. Supra, note 4.
43. Id.
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special legislative committees and should be subject to the same
limitations.
One year later, in a case that challenged the validity of the
federal Anti-Inflation Act, counsel presented a variety of extrinsic
evidence to the Supreme Court of Canada for its consideration,
including a white paper which was tabled in the House by the
Minister of Finance, as well as economic statistics, an economic
study, and a speech delivered by the governor of the Bank of
Canada. 44 This material was put forth to help the court characterize
the nature of the legislation, or, in constitutional terms, its pith and
substance. It was not tendered to resolve the construction of terms in
the act, but to show the social circumstances that existed at the time
the legislation was passed and the evil it was intended to correct.
Chief Justice Laskin concluded that, in a constitutional case in
which federal legislation is challenged, extrinsic material relating to
the social circumstances in which the legislation was passed could
be considered by the court to determine whether or not the
legislation was valid. In the process of reaching this conclusion, the
Chief Justice expressed the view that "no general principle of
admissibility or inadmissibility can or ought to be propounded by
this court and that questions of resort to extrinsic evidence and what
kind of extrinsic evidence may be admitted must depend on the
constitutional issues on which it is sought to adduce such
evidence." 45 Clearly, the emphasis in this case was upon the use of
extrinsic evidence in constitutional cases, with the court making
decisions of admissibility on an ad hoc basis. There was no
reference to the position to be taken in nonconstitutional cases.
This approach seems to suggest that the Supreme Court will rule
some kinds of extrinsic evidence to be inadmissible, presumably
because they are not relevant to the issues to be decided. But, in
making their ruling as to relevancy and admissibility, the court will
presumably have to examine the material to some extent, unless it is
prepared to exclude particular items by virtue of their very nature,
such as statements made by ministers or other members of
Parliament in the course of legislative debate.
Mr. Justice Ritchie declared that extrinsic evidence, in general,
and the white paper, in particular, were not only admissible but
were essential in order that the court would have before it the same
44. Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4.
45. Supra, note 4 at 389.
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material that Parliament had had at the time the statute was enacted.
From this material, the court could discover the circumstances
which prompted the enactment and, thus, could presumably draw
some inference as to the purpose of the legislation. Mr. Justice
Beetz was prepared to go further and to consult Hansard, "not to
construe and apply the provisions of the Anti-Inflation Act but to
ascertain its constitutional pivot." ' 46 The decision of the Supreme
Court in the Anti-Inflation case is important because the court
makes it clear that there is no longer a general rule of exclusion
prohibiting the admission of extrinsic materials, at least not in
constitutional cases. It is not entirely clear, however, just how the
court will make its ad hoc decisions on admissibility and how much
the court will, of necessity, be exposed to material that may
eventually be declared inadmissible.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada was prepared to consult a
variety of extrinsic evidence in the case of the Anti-Inflation Act, it
clearly did so in the context of trying to resolve a constitutional
issue. In order to characterize the nature and purpose of the
legislation, the court was prepared to widen the context within
which to construe the legislation, but there is little indication in the
judgments that the court would be prepared to relax the exclusionary
rule in nonconstitutional cases.
(b) Law Reform Commission Reports
While the Canadian Supreme Court was struggling to reach some
kind of consensus about the admissibility of Royal Commission
reports, the rapid development of law reform commissions and
agencies was to have its impact as well. During the 1960s and
1970s, the research efforts of these agencies began to appear in the
form of extensive reports which covered various areas of the law
and included recommendations for reform. Many law reform
reports were accompanied by draft statutes, which were often used
as a starting point or model for subsequent legislative enactments.
It was, no doubt, an appreciation of the great importance of this
kind of extrinsic evidence, in the form of legislative history or
expanded context, that prompted the efforts by judicial members of
the House of Lords to have specific provisions included in several
pieces of legislation which were drafted in response to Law Reform
46. Id., at 470.
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Commission studies. 47 If enacted, these provisions would have
specifically permitted the courts to consider the content of Law
Commission reports when called upon to interpret the statutes in
question. However, the efforts of the Law Lords were frustrated by
the legislators in the House of Commons who refused to allow the
inclusion of these provisions. The basis for their rejection was that
such provisions would reduce the authority of Parliament and inflate
the authority of the Law Commission, thereby placing it, in a sense,
even above the judiciary.
The use of Law Reform Commission reports was first considered
in 1978 by the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Laidlaw v.
The Municipality of Metro Toronto.48 This was a nonconstitutional
case in which the report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission,
which dealt with the basis of compensation for expropriation, was
presented in evidence. Mr. Justice Spence, speaking for the
Supreme Court, did not appear to distinguish between Royal
Commission reports and those of Law Reform Commissions when
he declared, "It has been established that such reports may be
considered not by seeking to interpret the statute in accordance with
the recommendations in the report but to determine the problem
which faced the legislatures and which they must have sought to
meet in the new statute." 49 To support this proposition, Mr. Justice
Spence referred to one case, although he acknowledged that there
were others cited by counsel that could have been used in support as
well. The case cited was the 1975 decision of the House of Lords in
Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerk Walhof-
Aschaffenburg A.G. 50 In this case, the House of Lords had been
urged to consult the report of a special committee which had, some
forty years earlier, dealt with the reciprocal enforcement of foreign
judgments. In addition to a description of the law as it existed forty
years ago, the report included recommendations, a draft bill, other
47. During the report stage of the Animals Act in the House of Lords, Lord
Wilberforce moved an amendment which read, "in ascertaining the meaning of any
of the provisions of this Act regard may be had to the Report of the Law
Commission on Civil Liability for Animals (Law Commission No. 13)." The
amendment was carried by a vote of 44 to 26, with all the Law Lords in favour of it.
However, the proposed amendment does not seem to have passed through the
Commons. A similar attempt was made when the Matrimonial Proceedings and
Property Bill was passed by the House of Lords and suffered a similar fate.
48. Supra, note 4.
49. Id., at 522.
50. Supra, note 23.
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instruments intended to embody the recommendations, and
comments on what the committee thought the bill would achieve.
The matter was further complicated by the fact that legislation, in
substantially the same form as the draft bill, had been enacted by the
English legislature one year later. The Law Lords were called upon
to decide how much of the report was admissible and for what
purposes.
All of the Law Lords - Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord
Diplock, Viscount Dillhorne, and Lord Simon of Glaisdale -
agreed that the report could be referred to by the court for purposes
of identifying the mischief aimed at and the state of the law as it was
then understood to be. However, there were sharp differences of
opinion regarding use of the report for other purposes. Lords Reid,
Wilberforce, and Diplock expressed the view that the court could
not take into account the committee's recommendations or
comments on the draft bill. Lord Wilberforce made it clear that none
of the material, including the entire report, could be used as direct
evidence of what the proposed enactment meant or what the
committee thought it meant. However, two of the justices, Viscount
Dillhorne and Lord Simon of Glaisdale, were prepared to go
further. Viscount Dillhorne declared that it was legitimate to use
other parts that were of importance, such as the recommendations,
to help interpret the statute. Not only would the other material be
helpful in disclosing the object or purpose of the act and
Parliament's intention, but the practical difficulty of being selective
meant that the court would have to draw "a very artificial line
which serves no useful purpose. ''5 1 Viscount Dillhome did draw
the line at Hansard debates, however. It is apparent that Lords Reid,
Wilberforce, and Diplock, all of whom were willing to refer to
extrinsic evidence, but only for limited purposes, could not avoid
reading the material in its entirety.
Lord Simon was prepared to accept the entire report because, by
so doing, the court could thereby place itself in the shoes of the
draftsman. He felt that in order to ascertain the meaning of the word
"use", the court must obtain all of the knowledge that the
promulgator of the enactment would have had. While not ruling on
the point precisely, Lord Simon indicated that he was not
convinced by the objection that the court could not consider the
commission's recommendations. As he suggested, usually the court
51. Id., at 622.
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need only look to the statute to determine whether the
recommendations had been followed. His Lordship would also have
consulted the Commentary, had this been necessary, because "to
refuse to consider such a commentary when parliament has
legislated on the basis and face of it is for the interpreter to fail to
put himself in the real position of the promulgator of the instrument
before assaying its interpretation." 
5 2
The decision of the House of Lords in Black-Clawson is
important and illuminating, and has been examined in some detail
here because the Law Lords attempted in it to justify their position
vis-a-vis the admissibility of the various kinds of extraneous
material and have thus revealed, to some extent, their underlying
concerns. For example, several of their Lordships seemed fearful
that undue reliance upon the recommendations or comments of
special committees or upon statements made in the House by
ministers would somehow restrict their freedom of interpretation.
53
This concern appears in rather strange contrast to the commonly
expressed fear that resort to extrinsic material would allow a court
too much leeway and discretion in determining parliamentary
intent. Other members of the House of Lords expressed concerns of
a constitutional nature, involving the problem of unfair surprise to
the citizen. 54 If the court establishes a statutory meaning on the
basis of the material that is unknown and generally unavailable to
the citizen, does this violate the principle of the rule of law which
requires that the law be certain and that citizens have notice of it?
Just how serious this concern really is must be questioned when we
see that some members of the judiciary are prepared to assume that
Law Reform Commission reports will be read by the public.
55
Several members of the House of Lords in Black-Clawson also
seemed to balk at the thought of the courts amending statutes so as
52. Id., at 652.
53. Lord Reid, Wilberforce, and Diplock seemed to express such a concern, with
Lord Wilberforce expressing it most clearly.
54. Lord Diplock expressed his concern by stating that "the acceptance of the rule of
law as a constitutional principal requires that a citizen, before committing himself to
any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal
consequences that will flow from it" (at p. 638). Lord Simm also referred to the fact
that the interpretor must be concerned with the reasonable expectations of those who
may be offended by the legislation (p. 645).
55. Lord Denning has assumed that lawyers can and will consult reports of Royal
Commissions and other preparatory works. Supra, note 13. Lord Simon, in
Black-Clawson, considered the commentary in a draft bill to be within the shared
knowledge of Parliament and the citizenry. Supra, note 23 at p. 651.
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to give effect to what the legislatures intended to say, rather than to
what they in fact said, either because this would be an unwarranted
extension of executive and legislative power or because it would be
unfair to the citizen who does not have due notice of the law he is
expected to obey. 56 However, if the words are ambiguous, then the
court can give effect to the legislative intent and extrinsic evidence
can be considered, even though some citizens might have
reasonably picked the wrong meaning upon which to act. 5 7 There is
also the efficiency argument, expressed by Lord Simon, which
holds that by declaring extrinsic material to be inadmissible, the
volume of material is thereby reduced and the court's time is saved
for more important work. On the other hand, the desire, expressed
by some members of the House of Lords, to put the court in the
shoes of the draftsman and thus enlarge the context of interpretation
considerably seems to conflict with previously mentioned consider-
ations, such as the citizen's reliance upon what was enacted,
judicial efficiency, and judicial freedom to interpret. Whether these
reasons are accepted or not, English judges at least seem to be
prepared to discuss the respective considerations that affect their
rulings on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Canada
in relation to extrinsic evidence was that made by Mr. Justice
Dickson, speaking for the court in the Re Residential Tenancies Act
case. 58 In this dispute, the court was concerned with the
constitutional validity of provincial legislation. The Attorney
General for Ontario presented in evidence a report of the Ontario
Law Reform Commission. The Supreme Court declared such a
56. "We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they
said" (Lord Reid at p. 613). It is sound enough to ascertain, if that can be done, the
objectives of any particular measure, and the background of the enactment; but to take
the opinion, whether of a Minister or an official or a committee, as to the intended
meaning in particular application of a clause or a phrase, would be a stunting of the law
and not a healthy development" (Lord Wilberforce at p. 630). "In construing it (the
statute) the court must give effect to what the words of the statute would be reasonably
understood to mean by those whose conduct it regulates. That any or all of the
individual members of the two Houses of Parliament that passed it may have thought
the words bore a different meaning cannot affect the matter. Parliament, under our
constitution, is sovereign only in respect of what is expressed by the words used in the
legislation it has passed" (Lord Diplock at p. 638). "Courts of construction interpret
statutes with a view to ascertaining the intention of Parliament expressed therein. But
as in interpretation of all written material, what is to be ascertained is the meaning of
what Parliament has said and not what Parliament meant to say" (Lord Simon at 645).
57. Per Lord Diplock at 638.
58. Supra, note 4.
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report admissible to show the factual context and purpose of the
legislation, and specifically held that the early exclusionary rule
expressed in obiter by Rinfret C.J. in a 1950 decision of the
Supreme Court, was no longer a correct statement of the law. 59 The
Supreme Court then reiterated its reluctance to enunciate any
inflexible rule governing the admissibility of extrinsic material in
constitutional reference cases. Mr. Justice Dickson declared that
"[m]aterial relevant to the issues before the court and not inherently
unreliable or offending against public policy should be admissible,
subject to the proviso that such extrinsic materials are not available
for the purpose of aiding in statutory construction.' '60
This statement certainly requires some clarification. What is
"inherently unreliable material"? Was Mr. Justice Dickson referring
here to speeches made in the legislature, which he described as
being generally inadmissible because they have little evidential
weight? What material offends against public policy? What does
public policy mean in this context? The pronouncements made by
Mr. Justice Dickson, speaking for the Supreme Court in 1981,
should be contrasted with an extrajudicial statement made by his
Lordship to the Law Society of Upper Canada in 1979.61 In his
1979 speech, Mr. Justice Dickson expressed his personal view,
indicating that he favoured admitting legislative history, in all its
forms, in both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases. He
suggested further that the material should be used not only to
determine the evil that the statute was designed to correct, but to
acquaint the court with the operation and effect of the statute and to
interpret its specific terms. While Mr. Justice Dickson seems, in his
extrajudicial declarations, to have been directing his attention
primarily to legislative history in the form of Hansard debates,
committee minutes, and white papers, as opposed to the reports of
Royal Commissions or Law Reform Commissions, it seems very
clear that this liberal attitude towards legislative history would apply
with equal force and even greater validity to reports of such
commissions. However, such a personal position seems far in
advance of the one expressed by Mr. Justice Dickson on behalf of
the Supreme Court in the Residential Tenancies case.
59. Reference Re Validity of Warline Leasehold Regulations, [ 1950] S.C. R. 124.
60. Re Residential Tenancies Act (1979), supra, note 4 at 723.
61. Supra, note 1.
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(c) Actual Practice in the Courts
In light of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada which
culminated in the judgment of Dickson J. in Re Residential
Tenancies, it is reasonably clear that pre-enactment reports can be
used in constitutional cases to outline the social conditions
prevailing at the time of enactment, to discover the mischief the
legislature was trying to remedy, and to illuminate the general
purpose of the act. It is equally clear, however, that the same report
cannot be used to interpret specific provisions in the statute, and that
reference to and reliance upon the recommendations of the
commissioners for this purpose or any other is equally prohibited. It
has already been noted that Canadian courts have, historically, been
generally prepared to take a more liberal approach towards extrinsic
evidence in constitutional cases. 62 The situation with regard to
nonconstitutional cases has not been as clear, and it was not until
Law Reform Commission reports appeared in some quantity that the
issue was squarely presented to the court. The Laidlaw63 decision
by the Supreme Court supports the use of commission reports in
nonconstitutional cases, subject to the same restrictions as applied
in constitutional cases. However, there seems to be an additional
restriction, that being that the language must first be determined to
be ambiguous. 6
4
An examination of what Canadian courts actually do is revealing.
In several cases, the courts have ignored the imposed restrictions
and have used commission reports to interpret provisions in the
statutes by considering the recommendations contained in the
commission reports. In the Laidlaw case itself, Mr. Justice Spence,
after enunciating the rule, cited a paragraph from the commission
report which advocated a certain course of action and then
expressed the view that "the Legislature adopted such a course.' 65
In another decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which
involved the interpretation of words in the Criminal Code, Mr.
Justice Estey referred to a report of the Royal Commission on
insanity, and noted that "these words (know and appreciate) were
the subject of comment in the report.' '66 He then proceeded to quote
62. Seep. 18.
63. Supra, note 4.
64. Id., at 522. This appears to be the thrust of the position taken by the House of Lords
per Lord Reid in Black-Clawson and relied upon by Mr. Justice Spence.
65. Id., at 523.
66. R. v. Barnier (1980) 31 N.R. 273.
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from the report and to interpret the statute. In several other cases
involving provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code, the Supreme
Court has referred to Royal Commission reports for assistance. 67 In
Regina v. Schwartz,6 8 Dickson J., dissenting, used a Royal
Commission report not only to reveal the history of the statute in
question of the mischief it was intended to cure, but to interpret
provisions in the statute itself.
In actual practice, then, Canadian courts and the Supreme Court
itself go beyond the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. We
should not be surprised at this, because it would seem to be very
difficult for a court to admit a report and yet try to confine itself to a
consideration of selective parts of that report for limited purposes
without also considering comments that might relate to the meaning
of certain provisions or to recommendations that might suggest the
inclusion of certain provisions. One thing would lead to another; the
search for mischief would lead to a determination of purpose, and
the court would, no doubt, be looking for specific answers to
specific questions, whether they materialized or not.
(i) Reference to Hansard Debates
The prevailing position in both Canada and England is that
statements made in Parliament, by its members and in relation to a
particular piece of legislation, are not admissible before a court that
is engaged in the interpretation of that legislation. The rule was
enunciated somewhat tenuously over two hundred years ago by
J.W. Willes in dicta. In Miller v. Taylor,6 9 the English court was
asked to consider changes made in a bill as a result of committee
debates which took place during its passage through Parliament.
Mr. Justice Willes refused to do so, on the grounds that neither the
sovereign nor the other House would be aware of the changes.
Despite his declaration of the rule, Mr. Justice Willes nevertheless
proceeded to consider the history of the changes that the bill
underwent. And despite the fact that the promulgator of the rule
actually ignored it, the exclusionary rule, though subject to some
exceptions, had been broadened and strengthened by the end of the
nineteenth century so as to apply to a wide variety of extrinsic
67. See, forexample,Beerstrom v. Lauren (1981) S.C.R. 539;R. v. Sault St. Marie,
[ 197812 S.C.R. 1299 at 1320 per Dickson J.
68. [1976] 8 N.R. 585 at 609.
69. Supra, note 3.
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materials. In a recent confirmation of the rule by the House of
Lords, 70 several reasons for the rule were suggested, in addition to
the one put forth by Willes in Miller v. Taylor. In putting forth that
reason, members of the House of Lords explained that what was
said in Parliament was not really very helpful and was usually
unreliable because "the pressures of executive responsibility ...
are not always condusive to a clear and unbiased explanation of the
meaning of statutory language. ' 71 In addition, the increased
volume of material, if accessible, would add considerably to the
time and expense of counsel preparing the case and would impose
an additional burden upon the courts. The Law Commission of the
United Kingdom and Scotland considered the exclusionary rule in
1969. 72 They concluded that it should be retained because of the
difficulty of isolating information that would assist the courts in
their interpretive endeavours and of making such information
available in a reasonably convenient and accessible form.
There are other objections that might be raised as well, many of
which apply to other extrinsic material, such as commission reports.
Because the legislative debates are not readily accessible to the
general public, it would be unfair to use this material to interpret the
basic statute. Its use might also make it too easy for judges to
legislate by allowing them to create ambiguities, rather than clarify
the statutory provisions. Reference to legislative history might also
distract them unduly from a study of the words of the statute. A
court's acceptance of or reliance upon the statements of ministers in
effect allows the executive to legislate through Hansard, thus
enhancing an already powerful arm of government.
In spite of the general acceptance of the exclusionary rule and the
rationale for its application, there is evidence of some judicial
support for its relaxation in certain situations. For example, Lord
Reid has suggested in dicta that it might be desirable to make an
exception to the general rule in those cases where Hansard would
almost certainly settle the matter one way or the other. 73 This test
has been referred to in several Canadian cases, 74 and Lord Simon
has also suggested, on several occasions, that reference to Hansard
70. Davis v.Johnson, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 570.
71. Per Lord Scarman at 582.
72. Supra, note 6.
73. Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioners, (1969] 2 A.C. 256 at 279.
74. R. v. Stevenson andMcLean (1980) 57 C.C.C. 2d 526, and Babineau v.Babineau
(1981) 122 D.L.R. 3d 508.
36 The Dalhousie Law Journal
might be permissible in order to determine the purpose of an
enactment. 75 As we have already noted, Mr. Justice Beetz would
consult Hansard to ascertain the constitutional pivot of legislation
alleged to be unconstitutional.
76
(ii) What the Courts Actually Do
In 1961, the Supreme Court of Canada made it very clear in the
Reader's Digest case that the exclusionary rule would be applied.
Mr. Justice Cartwright gave the following reason: "While I have
reached the conclusion that the evidence in question in this appeal is
inadmissible as a matter of law under the authorities and on
principle and not from the consideration of inconvenience that
would result from a contrary review, it may be pointed out that if it
were held that the minister's statement should be admitted there
would appear to be no ground on which anything said in either
house between the introduction of the Bill and its final passing into a
law would be excluded." ' 77 Thus, Canadian courts continue to
declare that reference to legislative statements are completely
prohibited; they cannot be used for any purpose in any kind of case.
Even the more liberal approach, adopted by courts in constitutional
cases, will not allow their admittance.
It is quite surprising, therefore, to see the number of cases in
which courts actually do refer to Hansard without excuse or
explanation. For example, in the case of Re Noah Estate, 78 Sisson
J. referred to the legislative history to determine the defect and
mischief the legislature sought to prevent. In the same year, a
member of the Alberta judiciary looked at prohibited material in the
form of a minister's statement in order to discover the intention of
the ministry in issuing a ministerial order. 79 In Ontario in The
Queen v. Board of Broadcast Governors,80 Mr. Justice McKuer
consulted legislative history to determine the intention of the
legislature. More recently, Hansard was consulted by members of
the Supreme Court of Canada, not just to determine mischief, but to
75. In Crouch v.McMillan, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1102 at 1119, and Dockers' Labour
Club v. Race Relations Bd., [1974] 3 All E.R. 592 and 600.
76. Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4 at 470.
77. Supra, note 3 at p. 793.
78. (1962) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 185d 203.
79. The Queen v. Flemming (1962) 35 D.L.R. 2d 483 at 490.
80. (1962) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 385 at 398.
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help interpret words into statute, 8 ' and a member of the Ontario
Supreme Court has referred to the words of an amending bill, at the
stage of first reading, in order to help determine the proper meaning
of the words in the statute.8 2 It is no wonder, then, that one member
of the judiciary came to the conclusion that "there appears to be a
broadening reception of political statements, i.e. the statements of
Cabinet Ministers of Legislatures and discussion papers at or before
introduction of legislation and that this applies to both constitutional
and non-constitutional cases." 83 In this latter case, the Canadian
judge suggested that reference to legislative statements might be
permissible and possible where a look at Hansard would also most
certainly settle the matter, as Lord Reid had suggested in R. v.
Warner. 
8 4
It was perhaps with knowledge of such court practices in mind
that Mr. Justice Dickson was prompted to suggest, in 1979, that it
might now be possible for a court to resort to a broad range of
extrinsic matters, including legislative history. In the process of
expressing the view that the Supreme Court of Canada had, in the
Anti-Inflation Act Reference, "signaled an increasing receptiveness
to the use of extrinsic materials," 85 Mr. Justice Dickson also
suggested what the purpose and useful limits of such materials
might be. From his remarks, it seems that he was approving of and
advocating the use of Hansard, committee minutes, and white
papers in both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases to
determine the purpose of the statute as a step in the process of
determining the proper meaning of specific provisions. In his
words, "Justice should not be blind to the purpose of
Parliament." ' 86 Certainly, the actual practices of some Canadian
courts support such a position.
In arriving at his conclusion regarding admissibility, Mr. Justice
Dickson did consider the usual objections to the use of legislative
history, many of which seem to be a reflection of the more general
problem that the court is being asked to determine what the legislature
meant to say, rather than what it did say. His suggestion that a new,
81. R. v. Vasil(1981) 1 S.C.R. 469at 487.
82. R. v. Paul, [1978] 39 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (C.A.).
83. Grange J. in Babineau v. Babineau, supra, note 71, affirmed 1982, 133 DLR
(3d) 767.
84. Supra, note 71.
85. Supra, note 1, p. 1.
86. Id., at 164.
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liberal approach to extrinsic evidence as an aid to statutory
interpretation might be appropriate appears to be based on his views
that the court's duty extends beyond the interpretation of the words
used in the statute. While this broader view of the court's duty is to be
applauded, it is unfortunate that Justice Dickson did not offer a more
extensive explanation or analysis of the basis for his conclusion.
Unlike judges in English courts, Canadian judges have not openly
discussed the competing considerations that determine the courts'
approach to statutory interpretation and the use of extrinsic evidence.
By advocating a more liberal approach to the use of extrinsic evidence,
Mr. Justice Dickson was implicitly declaring that the need to discover
the purpose of the legislative enactment overrides other considera-
tions, such as unfair surprise to the citizen and the principle of the rule
of law or the certainty of law, as it operates in this regard. English
judges have been very concerned about the effects that a more liberal
policy with regard to extrinsic evidence might have upon citizens, and
one American commentator has suggested that a recent decision of the
American Supreme Court to adopt a literal approach to statutory
interpretation can be explained on the basis that it is ajudicial reaction
to expanding government regulation. 87
There seems to be a growing tendency for English and Canadian
courts to broaden the statutory context and to consult extrinsic
evidence, but the majority appear to have drawn the line short of using
the material as direct evidence of statutory meaning or intention.
However, once admitted, attempts to limit the use of extrinsic
evidence seem destined to fail. If the legislation is ambiguous, one can
more easily rationalize looking at extrinsic evidence on the basis that
the citizen is not being unfairly surprised by having relied on the one
clear meaning. Instead, he has unfortunately chosen the wrong one of
two possible meanings, but, as Lord Reid has observed, "There are
comparatively few cases where the words of a statutory provision are
only capable of having one meaning." 88
VII. Conclusion
Decisions of English courts and, in particular, those of the House of
Lords reveal a clear inclination to expand the use of extrinsic material
for statutory interpretation purposes. Membership in the common
87. Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court (1982) 95 HLR 892.
88. Black-Clawson v. Papierwerk, supra, note 23 at 613.
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market and exposure to continental approaches to interpretation may
have contributed to the sympathetic attitudes toward the use of external
material. But the new development has been accompanied by
forthright discussion of important underlying considerations.
Canadian courts appear, by their actions, to be moving in the same
direction and towards greater use of extrinsic materials. However,
authoritative judicial pronouncements by the Supreme Court of
Canada suggest a very cautious loosening of the traditional
exclusionary bonds. Whether or not they are intended, the signals are
very conservative and give little guidance at this point as to future
developments. In nonconstitutional cases, such as Laidlaw, the
reports of law reform commissions can now be admitted in order to
show the court what social problem the legislation was designed to
meet, and the remedy. In actual practice, however, pre-enactment
material seems to be used for other purposes, including the
interpretation of specific statutory provisions.
In the course of this paper, we have looked at several objections that
the courts have raised against a more liberal use of extrinsic evidence.
English courts, in particular, have suggested that it would be unfair to
the citizen to have the court determine the proper meaning of a
legislative provision on the basis of extrinsic evidence to which the
citizen does not have easy access and which may be unknown to him,
such as commission reports or debates in Hansard. It has also been
suggested that heavy reliance on this kind of material will enhance the
power of the executive branch of government and diminish the power
of the court. Interestingly enough, the converse, the concern that resort
to such extrinsic material will enable the court to exceed its proper
function and allow it to legislate, has also been expressed. In addition,
there are the convenience arguments concerning the cost to the litigants
and the delay in court operations. Do any of these objections have
overriding merit?
With regard to the citizen, courts have, for some time, admitted
extrinsic evidence in the form of statutes in pari materia, as well as
earlier versions of the same statutes, and do not seem to have been
concerned with the argument of unfair surprise. If the words in the
statute are ambiguous, the citizen may quite innocently choose one
meaning while the court determines that another meaning was what
the legislature intended. It is questionable just how far the unfair
surprise argument can really be taken and still retain its validity.
Insofar as the impact such extrinsic evidence would have on the
court's functioning is concerned, it is quite clear that the court does
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not have to accept any of the evidence that is presented to it and that
it is free to make its own determination as to how relevant the
evidence is and how much weight should be given to it. Clearly, the
court can control the use of this evidence in whatever way it sees fit.
Does this give the court too much discretion? The danger that
executive powers will thus be enhanced does not appear to be very
great, particularly if the court remains cognizant of its role as a
mediator between the state and the citizen.
There is, however, some validity to the suggestion that individual
judges may use such material to avoid the clear words of the statute
in cases where those words produce a result which offends the
judge's sense of justice, either in a particular way or in a more
general way. However, the need to make the legislation effective
would seem to override the risk that particular judges might use
their discretion in non-legitimate ways. There is also some weight to
the argument that addresses itself to the accessibility of such
material and its costs to the litigants. But even in a situation where
the material is declared to be inadmissible, as is currently the case
with regard to Hansard debates, some counsel will still take the time
to consult that material in an effort to build an argument about a
legislative intention that might prove attractive to a court. In
practice, much of this material is being placed before courts now,
and the liberalization of the rules will not, I suggest, have a
particularly significant impact upon future litigation.
Unfortunately, Canadian courts have not tried to analyze the
validity of the exclusionary rules in light of the needs of
contemporary Canadian society. Should they do so, such an
evaluation would also prompt them to assess the proper function of
a court which is faced with a problem of statutory interpretation.
Does an expansion of the legislative context by the admission of
extrinsic material unfairly prejudice individual citizens or is such a
liberalization made necessary by the demands of modern society?
Mr. Justice Dickson, in his extrajudicial remarks of 1979, seemed
to suggest that the latter consideration is growing in importance and
may require the courts to reconsider their proper function. His
remarks were made prior to our constitutional amendments, which
resulted in the adoption of a new Charter of Rights.
The new amendments to the Canadian Constitution make specific
reference in the preamble to the rule of law as a concept embodied
in the basic principles upon which Canada, as a nation, is founded.
Will such a declaration, emphasizing as it does the importance of
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the rule of law, constrain future attempts by counsel and Canadian
courts to expand the use of extrinsic material in statutory
interpretation? It is possible, of course, that resort to extrinsic
material could help predict the rights and freedoms of individuals by
clarifying the legislative intention in a given case. However, much
will depend upon the particular situation and the kind of legislative
enactment being interpreted.
As society increases in its complexity and as the problems created
by such a society become more difficult to cope with, the need to
make sure that legislative solutions are as effective as possible
becomes more and more important. I suggest that this is becoming
our overriding concern, one which overshadows other objections,
such as court convenience, litigant costs, and fairness to citizens.
The practical problems of regulating our modem society over-
shadow the courts' function as a protector of citizens. This is not to
say that the courts will not be able to fulfill their other function, that
of protecting citizens from excessive state regulation, but of the two
competing values or considerations, the need to make legislative
enactments operationally effective seems to be the one that is
growing in strength. If this is the case, let us hope that Canada's
highest court will articulate its position with a full and open
discussion of the competing issues if and when the appropriate
opportunity presents itself.
